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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Plaintiff/Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on July 29, 2004. The Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 4, Utah
Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the trial court misinterpret U.C.A. § 31 A-22-309(l)(a) to require that the
jury be prohibited from awarding damages to plaintiff until it first made a special finding that
plaintiffs automobile-accident-related medical expenses exceeded $3,000, when the no-fault
statutory scheme does not create a burden of proof at trial, but instead requires that any
dispute over the amount of a plaintiff s medical bills be raised by the defendant and resolved
before a plaintiff is allowed to maintain a cause of action for general damages at trial?
The court of appeals reviews a trial court's interpretation of a statute on a
correctness standard, granting no deference to the trial court: 'The interpretation of a statute
. . . presents a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness." Parks v. Utah
Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, ^[ 4, 53 P.3d 473. Also, where, as here, a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or new trial is based on the interpretation of law, an appellate
court reviews the trial court's ruling for correctness. Horrellv. Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co., 909
P.2d 1279,1280 (Ct. App. 1996). The issue was preserved in the trial court as evidenced in
R. 268 (2:6-7, 6:6-7), R. 214-15.
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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition
of this appeal:
31 A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage
under a policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a
cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged
to have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has
sustained one or more of the following:
(i) death;
(ii) dismemberment;
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective
findings;
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical,
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance,
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed the total minimum required
coverage of $3,000 per person;
(e) (i) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the
issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or
expenses.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff was injured from a rear-end automobile collision and brought suit to
recover his damages. The case was tried to a jury on February 4, 5, and 6, 2004. At the
close of defendant's evidence, plaintiff moved for directed verdict, asserting that the only
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valid issue for the jury was the amount of damages to award plaintiff. The court denied
plaintiffs motion. At the close of trial on February 6, 2004, the court submitted a special
verdict form to the jury which, contrary to the court's order of February 2, 2004, asked the
jury to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether plaintiff had incurred
accident-related medical bills in excess of $3,000 and, if not, prohibited the jury from
awarding any damages to plaintiff.
The jury found that defendant's negligence had caused injury to plaintiff, but
found that plaintiffs medical bills did not exceed $3000 and, following the court's direction,
awarded no damages to plaintiff. The court then entered judgment for defendant.
On March 12,2004, plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
or in the alternative, a new trial on damages, arguing that it was legal error to submit a
threshold question to the jury. The court denied plaintiff s motion and plaintiff filed a Notice
of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff was injured on September 25, 1997, when the vehicle he was

driving was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by defendant. R. 1, 6.
2.

Prior to filing suit, State Farm Insurance Company, which was

plaintiffs no-fault insurer as well as defendant's liability insurer, evaluated and paid over
$3,500 in medical bills as related to the collision. R. 214, 226-229.
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3.

At no time before the start of trial did defendant move to contest the

amount of plaintiff s medical bills or to dispute that plaintiff had satisfied the requirements
of U.CA. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) to maintain a claim for general damages.
4.

On February 2, 2004, the court entered "Order on Defendant's

Liability/' ordering as follows:
The court shall enter a finding and the jury shall
be instructed that Defendant was negligent and
that Defendant's negligence proximately caused
the collision.
The issues presented to the jury for decision will
be limited to proximate causation of Plaintiffs
injuries and to the amount of Plaintiff s damages.
R.83-84.
5.

The case was tried to a jury on February 4, 5, and 6. R. 162-166.

6.

On the first day of trial, the court indicated that despite defendant's

failure to contest plaintiffs medical bills before trial, it would allow defendant to assert that
plaintiff had not met a $3,000 medical expense threshold, and also that it would instruct the
jury that it could not award damages to plaintiff unless it first determined by a preponderance
of evidence that plaintiff had incurred more than $3,000 in medical expenses from the
accident. R. 214.
7.

The court instructed plaintiff that he would not be allowed to introduce

evidence at trial that defendant's own liability carrier, State Farm Insurance Company, had
paid over $3,500 in plaintiff s medical bills from the accident, nor would plaintiff be allowed
-4-

to demonstrate to the jury that State Farm had performed an evaluation wherein it approved
certain of plaintiff s medical bills as related to the accident and denied payment for other bills
as not related to the accident. R. 214-215. The court stated the probative value of such
evidence was outweighed by unfair prejudice to defendant. R. 215.
8.

During trial, defendant targeted certain of plaintiff s medical bills and

adduced evidence through his experts that, in their opinion, certain treatments and billing
amounts were not related to the automobile collision, and that plaintiffs accident-related
medical bills did not exceed $3,000. R. 215.
9.

Plaintiff adduced evidence at trial that his accident-related medical bills

did exceed $3,000; however, the court would not allow plaintiff to adduce evidence that
defendant's liability carrier had acknowledged that plaintiff had incurred accident-related
medical bills in excess of $3,000. R. 213, 224.
10.

At the close of defendant's evidence at trial, plaintiff moved for directed

verdict, asserting that the only valid issue for the jury was the amount of damages awardable
to plaintiff. R. 215.
11.

The court denied plaintiffs motion for directed verdict and submitted

to the jury the issues of (1) causation, (2) whether plaintiff had incurred $3,000 in accidentrelated medical bills, and, if so, (3) the amount of plaintiff s damages. R. 215, 167-169.
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12.

The jury found that defendant's negligence had caused injury to

plaintiff, but did not find from a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiffs related
medical expenses exceeded $3,000. R. 167-168.
13.

Based on the jury's finding of less than $3,000 in accident-related

medical bills, the jury was instructed to make no further findings and to award nothing to
plaintiff. R. 168-169.
14.

The court entered judgment on behalf of defendant finding that

defendant's negligence had caused injury to plaintiff, but that plaintiff was entitled to no
damages because he had not incurred more than $3,000 in accident-related medical expenses.
R. 201-203.
15.

Subsequent to trial, plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, or alternatively, a new trial on damages, asserting, inter alia, it was legal error to
make plaintiff prove and to require the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff had incurred in excess of $3,000 in accident-related medical expenses, before the
jury would be allowed to award damages. R. 210-211.
16.

The court denied plaintiffs motion. R. 254-255.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

The trial court incorrectly interpreted U.C.A.§ 31A-22-309(l)(a) to require
submission of a special interrogatory to the jury which prohibited the jury from awarding
damages to Plaintiff until the jury first found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
-6-

plaintiff had incurred more than $3,000 in medical expenses related to his automobileaccident (in other words that plaintiff had met "threshold"). By its interpretation, the trial
court created a new burden of proof for plaintiff not authorized by the statute.
Rules of statutory construction require the court of appeals to interpret a
statutory provision according to its plain language and within the context of its statutory
scheme. Following such rules, the intent of U.C.A.§ 31A-22-309(l)(a) was not to create a
burden of proof at trial for plaintiff, but to provide a pre-adjudicative screening process to
remove less-severe car accident cases from the court system. Through the overall no-fault
statutory scheme and U.C.A.§ 31A-22-307(2)(e), the legislature established procedures to
screen non-threshold cases from the court system. Plaintiff met threshold, as acknowledged
by Defendant's own liability carrier through evaluation and payment of medical bills in
excess of $3,500. Defendant failed to contest by motion, the plaintiffs right to pursue
damages in court and plaintiff was therefore entitled to maintain his claims at trial without
a contest over the amounts of specific medical bills.
POINT II.
During litigation, plaintiff prepared to prove and at trial did prove his case on
the required elements of negligence and causation of injury. Just two days before trial, the
court ordered that these would be the only issues presented to the jury for resolution. R. 8384. By informing Plaintiff on the first day of trial that the jury would be presented with a
threshold question and that damages would be contingent on the jury's finding, the court
unexpectedly and unfairly saddled Plaintiff with a new burden of proof, and transformed the
-7-

nature of the trial Defendant focused his trial attack at creating questions on certain
treatments received by plaintiff and the amount of those bills. He was thus enabled to
undermine the real issues in the case and preclude plaintiff from any recovery.
The trial court compounded the effect of its legal error by precluding plaintiff
from adducing evidence that defendant's own liability carrier had acknowledged, through
evaluation and payment of plaintiff s bills, that plaintiff had met threshold.
POINT III.
The purpose of U.C.A.§ 31 A-22-309(l)(a) would be defeated, and enormous
judicial and litigant resources would be wasted through adopting the trial court's
interpretation of the statutory provision. Resolution of the threshold question need not and
should not take place at the end of a full-fledged trial. A system is already in place to resolve
the threshold question at the threshold of a legal case.
As evidenced by the trial court's statements during hearing of plaintiff s motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, guidance is needed from the appellate courts on
the meaning and application of the no-fault statutory scheme, including U.C.A.§ 31A-22309(l)(a).
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE NO-FAULT
STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT CREATE A NEW
BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL, BUT PROVIDES A
PRE-ADJUDICATIVE SCREENING PROCESS.
The court should reverse the trial court's Judgment and denial of plaintiff s
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, since the Judgment is based on the trial
court's legal error. The trial court erroneously submitted a no-fault threshold question to the
jury, prohibiting the jury from awarding any damages, unless it first found, by a
preponderance of evidence, that plaintiffs accident-related medical bills exceeded $3,000.
By enacting the no-fault automobile insurance scheme, including the $3,000
medical expense threshold to maintain a claim for general damages, the Utah State
Legislature did not create an additional burden of proof for plaintiffs suing for compensation
from an automobile collision, nor did it intend to require a full-fledged civil trial to determine
whether a given claim should have been resolved through the court system, or, whether it
belonged, all along, in the no-fault system. The plain-language intention of the threshold
statute was to screen less-severe cases from the court system, and, ostensibly, to lessen the
burden on the trial courts and conserve judicial resources. Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556,
562 (Utah App. 1997), Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Utah App.
1997). See also, 12A Mark S. Rhodes, Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:667, at 271 (rev. ed.
1981) (explaining "no-fault plans are designed to limit the number of common law tort suits
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arising out of automobile accidents. The mechanism for determining which claims are serious
enough to be the subject of litigation is the threshold."), George v. Welch, 997 P.2d 1248,
1251 (Colo. Ap. 1999) (u[T]he purpose of the threshold requirement [in no-fault scheme] is
to keep minor claims from clogging the courts."), Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41,
50-51; 378N.Y.S.2d 1,8-9; 340 N.E.2d 444 (1975), (stating that one purpose of no-fault law
was to ease the strain placed on the state judicial system by tort litigation), Creswell v.
Medical W. Community Health Plan, 419 Mass 327, 644 N.E.2d 970 (1995) (stating the
intent of no-fault scheme was, in part, to reduce the number of small motor vehicle tort cases
being entered in the courts), Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Starkey, 535 N.W.2d 363 (Minn 1995)
(citing Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. 1983) for the proposition that a
purpose of the no-fault law was to ease the burden of litigation on the courts).
U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a), states in relevant part:
A person who has . . . direct benefit coverage
under a policy which includes personal injury
protection may not maintain a cause of action for
general damages arising out of personal injuries
alleged to have been caused by an automobile
accident, except where the person has sustained
one or more of the following:
(v)

medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.

U.C.A.§ 31 A-22-309(l)(a) (emphasis added). As set forth, a plaintiff "may not maintain"
a cause of action for general damages unless he has sustained medical expenses in excess of
$3,000. This requirement complements and works in connection with the $3,000 minimum
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personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage of U.C.A.§ 31 A-22-307(l)(a). As explained by
the Utah Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie9 606 P.2d 1197, (Utah 1980),
Until the threshold requirements are met, the injured party is
limited to his direct benefit coverage. If his injuries meet the
threshold requirements, then he may maintain a claim for
general damages.
Id. at 1200. Thus, according to the statutory scheme, a PIP insurer must approve and pay the
$3,000 in coverage before the insured is procedurally allowed to maintain a cause of action
for general damages.
The no-fault statutory scheme also provides an avenue for resolving any
dispute after suit is filed, as to whether the plaintiff has legitimately met threshold:
In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or
on the motion of either party may designate an
impartial medical panel of not more than three
licensedphysicians to examine the claimant and
testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the
claimanfs medical services or expenses.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2)(e) (emphasis added). Note, this pre-trial process is
consistent with the words "may not maintain" contained in § 31 A-22-309(l)(a). A plaintiff
can only be precluded from maintaining a claim for general damages by removing the claim
from civil litigation. Conversely, to submit the threshold question to a jury does not prevent
a plaintiff from maintaining a claim for general damages. Jury resolution of a threshold issue
renders the above-quoted statutory provisions meaningless and defeats the statutes'
ostensible purpose of keeping minor cases from clogging up the courts' dockets.
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In the case at bar, plaintiff exceeded threshold before ever filing suit. This was
acknowledged by State Farm Insurance Company, defendant's own liability carrier, through
its evaluation and payment of more than $3,500 of plaintiff s medical bills. Defendant never
made any motion, as provided for in § 31A-22-307(2)(e), to dispute plaintiffs having met
threshold or to prevent plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action for general damages.
Plaintiff did maintain a cause of action for general damages, and was entitled to do so
without "threshold" being unexpectedly inserted as the main issue in the case and without
unexpectedly being saddled with a new burden of proof at trial.
Nowhere have Utah appellate courts been asked to interpret U.C.A .§ 31A-22309(1 )(a) to create a new burden of proof for plaintiffs in car accident cases. While CT v.
Johnson, 1999 UT 35,977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999), discusses award of general damages where
$3,000 in medical expenses were not awarded, it is clear from a reading of the case that no
challenge was exerted on appeal to the trial court's decision to submit a "threshold"
interrogatory to the jury. The validity of that practice was not before the court and has never
been addressed by Utah appellate courts.
Unlike Johnson, in the case subjudice, plaintiff does challenge the validity of
submitting a $3,000 medical expense threshold interrogatory to the jury, on the basis of Utah
Code Ann.§§ 31A-22-306 through 309. Had the Utah Supreme Court been faced with the
issue of submitting a "threshold" interrogatory to the jury, it certainly would have struck that
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practice down, under its own adopted rales of statutory construction. In Johnson, the court
stated:
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look
first to the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville
Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).
"We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning." Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah
1995) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "courts are not to infer
substantive terms into the text that are not already there.
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used,
and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to
an intention not expressed. "Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876
P.2d, 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted).
Id at Tf 31. (Emphasis added).
The plain language of U.C. A. §§ 31 A-22-309(l)(a) and 31 A-22-307(2)(e) does
not create a new burden of proof for plaintiffs at trial, nor does it provide for the jury to
determine at the end of a trial whether plaintiffs have the right to maintain their claim for
general damages through trial. The plain language creates a pre-adjudicative screening
process to determine if one can maintain a claim for general damages. Under the applicable
standard of review, the court of appeals should properly and definitively interpret the
statutory provisions according to their plain language and within the meaning of the no-fault
statutory scheme. Accordingly, the court of appeals should reverse the lower court rulings
and enter judgment for plaintiff.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF PREVAILED ON ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS AT
TRIAL AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED DAMAGES.
Over several months of litigation, plaintiff prepared to meet his burden ofproof
at trial. Two days before trial, February 2, 2004, the court entered an order, pursuant to the
parties stipulation (R. 83-84), finding defendant negligent and that defendant's negligence
had proximately caused the collision. R. 83-84. The court also ordered that the only issues
for the jury were causation of plaintiff s injuries and the amount of plaintiff s damages:
The issues presented to the jury for decision will
be limited to proximate causation of Plaintiffs
injuries and to the amount of Plaintiffs
damages.
R. 83-84. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff came to trial prepared to prove the remainder of his case. However,
on the first day of trial, the court informed the parties of its intention to require a jury finding
that plaintiff had met, by a preponderance of the evidence, the $3,000 no-fault medicalexpense threshold outlined in U.C.A. § 31A-22-309, before the jury could award damages.
That dramatically and unfairly changed the nature of the case and trial. While plaintiff did
finish proving his case and prevailed on the legal elements, the jury did not award damages
because of the prohibitive instruction of the court on the threshold issue.
Taking advantage of the court's decision to include threshold in the trial, the
defense largely ignored issues of negligence, causation, and damages and, instead, focused
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its attack on challenging the relatedness and amount of certain medical bills, all in an effort
to cause the jury to question bills in excess of $3,000. Defendant was thus allowed to
undermine plaintiff s whole case by simply attacking a few of the bills. The significance and
meaning of the trial was thereby transformed from the amount of proper compensation for
plaintiff, to precluding plaintiff from any recovery based on a technicality that should not
have been before the jury.
The legal error of allowing defendant to contest threshold and requiring the
jury to judge the validity of plaintiff s medical expenses before awarding general damages,
was compounded when the court precluded plaintiff from adducing evidence of the
evaluative process performed by defendant's liability carrier, the true party in interest,
wherein it acknowledged the relatedness of more than $3,500 of plaintiff s medical bills to
the accident. Defendant was thus allowed to hypocritically make threshold the major issue
in the case.

POINT III
INTERPRETING U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) TO CREATE A NEW
BURDEN OF PROOF DEFEATS ITS OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE AND IS
AN ENORMOUS WASTE OF JUDICIAL AND LITIGANT
RESOURCES.
As stated above, the ostensible purpose of U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) is to
lessen the burden on trial courts and conserve judicial resources by providing resolution of
less-severe cases outside the court system. This purpose is defeated and enormous judicial
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as well as litigant resources are wasted by going through a full-fledged trial, as happened in
the case at bar, just to get an answer from the jury that a plaintiffs case did not meet
threshold and never should have been tried at all.
The issue of judicial resources and court dockets in regard to non-threshold
automobile cases should be of concern to the Utah appellate judiciary. During hearing of
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the court revealed that it
always submits a threshold question to the jury on automobile cases and apparently will
continue to do so until an appellate court instructs otherwise:
And I-I guess the truth is, Mr. Raty, you may be
right, but no one's going to decide until it goes to
an appellate court. I mean this is every case I try,
I make the same decision every case. If it's
different, I wish they'd tell me, and they will, they
won't hesitate.
R. 268 (5:19-23). (Emphasis added).
Judicial and litigant resources need not and should not be wasted. A fullfledged trial is unnecessary to determine if a plaintiff should be allowed to maintain an award
for general damages in court. As discussed above and outlined in U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306
through 309, a much more economical system has already been established for directing
cases to the proper resolution venue. It is as follows: The no-fault insurer performs an
evaluation of medical bills submitted by the victim of an automobile accident to determine
if the treatment is related and the bills reasonable. If the insurer does not believe they are,
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it does not pay them. Often, the no-fault insurer hires a medical doctor to assist in this
evaluation. .
Once the no-fault insurer establishes satisfaction of threshold through approval
and payment of $3,000 in medical bills, the plaintiff may file his case for general damages.
Thereafter, defendant may make a motion with the court contesting the relatedness and/or
amount of the medical bills. If defendant fails so to move, plaintiff is allowed to maintain
his claim for general and other damages at trial. Yet, it is contrary to law, a perversion of the
statutory scheme's plain language, and grossly unfair to allow defendant to raise a threshold
issue at trial for the jury's decision, after plaintiff has already maintained a claim for general
damages.
CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the lower court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and remand with the order to enter judgment on
behalf of the plaintiff, along with an order for a new trial, solely on the amount of plaintiff s
damages. The jury found, and the court entered findings, that defendant was negligent and
that defendant's negligence proximately caused injury to plaintiff. The prerequisites were
thus met for an award of damages to plaintiff. It was legal error for the court to create an
additional burden of proof for plaintiff by prohibiting an award of damages until the jury
found, by a preponderance of evidence, that plaintiff had incurred in excess of $3,000 in
accident-related medical bills. Interpreting U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) to create a burden
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of proof at trial is contrary to its plain language and that of the no-fault statutory scheme, and
defeats their purpose of screening less severe cases from civil trial Such a construction also
results in enormous waste of judicial and litigant resources.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 17th day of February, 2005.

^r*^i

1

*

^

\ \

¥

Matthew H. Raty, Attorney for Appellant
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defendant's counsel at the address listed below, by depositing the same in the United States
mail, postage pre-paid on the \"^ May of February, 2005.
Attorney for Defendant
Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG AND HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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Addendum 1

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FE3 c 2 : m i I
Mark C. McLachlan (#2207)
SALT LAKE c c , u M
MARK C. McLACHLAN & ASSOCIATES. LC
zLi
Attorney for Plaintiff
^ ^
^ ^ ^
First National Bank Bldg.
480 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-0123
Facsimile (801) 521-0177
Matthew H. Raty (#6635)
RATY & KRAMER, L.L.C.
First National Bank Bldg.
480 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-0190
Facsimile (801) 521-0177
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GERALD VAUGHN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DARIN ANDERSON,
Defendant.

)1
1
)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
LIABILITY

])

Civil No. 010908321

1
]

Judge Robert K. Hilder

'

The parties have stipulated to Defendant's liability in the above-referenced matter,
specifically, that Defendant was negligent and that Defendant's negligence proximately caused the
collision in the above-referenced matter. Based upon the stipulation of the parties:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The court shall enter a finding and the jury shall be instructed that Defendant

was negligent and that Defendant's negligence proximately caused the collision.
2.

The issues presented to the jury for decision will be limited to proximate

causation of Plaintiff s injuries and to the amount of Plaintiff s damages.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of Ja»«afy, 2004.

ROSE
Honorable Judge

Approved as to form:
DATED this a&l day of January, 2004.

STRDNG/&HANNI
Attorney forjDefendant
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Addendum 2

FILED DISTRICT

Ikmi

Third Judicial District

FEB 0 8 200<f /' I
SALT LAKE COUNTY,!/
'

*

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GERALD VAUGHN,

Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

vs.
DARIN ANDERSON,

Defendant.

Civil No. 010908321
Judge Robert Hilder

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If
you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "yes." If you
find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented,
answer "no." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.
1.

The parties agree that Darin Anderson was negligent. Considering all of the
evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the negligence of the defendant, Darin Anderson, was the proximate cause

ka/4409 496

1 .

of any of the plaintiff Gerald Vaughn's injuries?
Yes X -

No

If your answer to Question No. 1 is "No", do not answer the remaining questions.
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "Yes," please continue.
2.

From a preponderance of the evidence, did the plaintiff, Gerald Vaughn,
sustain a permanent disability, a permanent impairment, or a permanent
disfigurement, as a proximate result of the accident?

Yes
3.

No X \

From a preponderance of the evidence, has the Plaintiff Gerald Vaughn
sustained $3,000 or more in medical expenses as a proximate result of the
accident?
Yes

No

X

If your answers to Questions No. 2 and 3 are both "No", do not answer Question
Number 4. If either or both answers to Questions No. 2 and 3 is "Yes", answer Question
No. 4.

ka/4409 496
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4.

State from a preponderance of the evidence the amount of general
and special damages sustained by Plaintiff Gerald Vaughn as a result
of the accident:
Special Damages
Past Medicals

$

Future Medicals

$

General Damages

$

TOTAL DAMAGES

$

Dated this ^ x > d a v of February, 2004.

ka/4409 496
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Addendum 3

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

GERALD VAUGHN,
Plaintiff,

5
vs.

6
7

Case No. 010908/T521
MOTION

DARIN ANDERSON,

8

(Videotape Proceedings)

Defendant.

9

-oOo-

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of May,

12

2004, commencing at the hour of 8:03 a.m., the above-

13

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

14

ROBERT HILDER, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court

15

for the purpose of this cause, and that the following

1G

videotape proceedings were had.

17

-oOo-

18
19

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

20
21
22
23

Third Judicial District

24

NOV 2 3 200%

23

MATTHEW H* RATY
Attorney at Law
Raty & Kramer
480 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
KRISTIN A- VAN ORMAN
Attorney at Law
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah

SALT LAKE COUNTY

ByDeputy Clerk
ALAN P SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266 0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107

ORIGINAL

84180

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Mr. Raty, it's your motion and I've read
it carefully.

I have to be very frank with you.

I certainly

have sympathy for your client and feel like you tried a very
fine case; but everything in there we argued about at trial,
nothing's changed for me. Tell me why it has. I mean, I just
don't understand what's new except that you filed a motion.
MR. RATY: Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.

As you know, your Honor, we—we tried this case in
February—
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MR. RATY:
year.

—the first week of February of this

And at the close of the defendant's evidence, the

plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on all issues except
the amount of damages in the case.
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MR. RATY: And you denied that motion and the jury
returned a verdict finding defendant had proximately caused
injury to the plaintiff, but did not award any damages, as it
had been prohibited from doing that based on a finding that
plaintiff had not met the $3,000 threshold in medical
expenses.
Now, looking at the statute, the—the Utah
Legislature created a—a scheme here.

2

In Utah Code Annotated

1

31-8-22—-or dash-22-dash 306 through 309. And that statutory

2

scheme, as you read through it, was obviously implemented to

3

keep out of court, keep out of your busy docket, certain types

4

of cases. Those cases—

5

THE COURT:

I'm not sure they were thinking too much

6

about my docket, in all candor; but they did want some

7

incentive to provide the coverages for financial

8

responsibility in the State.

9

mean, it has the effect, certainly, of limiting the number of

10

cases that come to court.

11
12

I think that was at the core. I

MR. RATY:
I

Sure. And—and I would submit that was

the purpose of the statute. You read the language and I think

13

that is clear.

14

Now, the language, 309 says that a plaintiff may not

15

maintain—may not maintain a—a claim for general damages in

16

court unless he's met a threshold.

17

criteria is $3,000 in medical expenses. Well, who makes that

18

determination?

19

the jury.

20
21
22 I

And one of the—one of the

According to the statute, not the court, not

THE COURT: Now, how does the statute say not the
court?
MR. RATY: Well, you read rule—or you read Section

23 | 307—let me give you the exact cite there.

307-2-(e) and that

24 I sets forth the procedure to be followed by the court if
25 I threshold is contested.

Now I will read that to you, your

Honor, it says—
THE COURT: Let me get it in front of me.

I—

MR. RATY: Sure.
THE COURT: — I know it, but let's be reading it
together.
Okay.

Go ahead.

MR. RATY: Thank you.
In disputed cases, a court, on its own motion or on
the motion of either party, may designate an impartial medical
panel of not more than three licensed physicians, to examine
the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value
of the claimant's medical services or expenses.
Now, no motion was made by defendant.

Plaintiff

certainly didn't make a motion, because he knew he had met
threshold, he—he had exceeded the $3,000 limit as
acknowledged by defendant's own liability carrier, State Farm.
And I submitted those letters to you.
State Farm wrote him and said, you—you've now
exceeded $3,000 in medical bills; in fact, in one of the
letters, they talk about meeting threshold and that he's got
to exceed more than $3,000.

So, we met it, defendant did not

make any motion to the Court disputing that threshold had been
made.
We were allowed under the statute to maintain a
claim for general damages here in your Court, and we should

4

have been allowed to maintain that—
THE COURT: But I think they're different things. I
think what you point out in the statute is about determining
entitlement under the (inaudible) statute. What I deal with
is a threshold requirement before the jury can award general
damages. And once it comes before me in that context, I do
not believe the legislature intended to substitute for the
jury that's empaneled, to create such a cumbersome system.

I

mean, if that—if the—if the legislature was trying to give
the court some relief, that's not the way to do it.
I think it then becomes simply a factual question
that you must meet as a threshold to get the general damages,
it's factual, it's for the jury, and it's necessarily so and
it's also important at that stage that the jury be permitted
to exercise its judgment and not be bound by a decision made
by a carrier who stands in a different relationship to the
plaintiff than the party contesting the matter in this court.
I mean, I know that's in there.

I just think it's

there for a different purpose. And I—I guess the truth is,
Mr. Raty, you may be right, but no one's going to decide until
it goes to an appellate court.

I mean, this is every case I

try, I make the same decision every case.

If it's different,

I wish they'd tell me, and they will, they won't hesitate. I
don't think they've said it, I think there's case law that
says the opposite. But I think I—I'm not in a position to

5

piecemeal say, I'm going to do it differently with you, I may
as well stick to what I do two to three months and let you
take it up, which, certainly is not only your right, but if
you think it's the appropriate approach, I'd encourage you to
do it.
MR. RATY: Okay.
THE COURT: But—but I—you—you've preserved the
issue, but we're just not seeing it the same way.
MR* RATY: All right. And I can see—and—and I
acknowledge, that's been a—a customary practice in the courts
for many years; but as we know, custom's not—
THE COURT: No.

I know, but the—it's got to be

changed on the appellate level.

I mean, I could be the one to

change it here and then there might be an appeal from the
other side.

I'm not sure how many minutes it would take Ms.

Van Orman to file the notice, but it would be pretty quick.
So, I mean, someone's going to have to take it up. Your
argument's not without some logic, it's just that I don't
think it's what was intended.

And it is a legal argument.

MR. RATY: Right.
THE COURT:

I think it's one that could be addressed

up there. And I'm not sure you'd be doing anyone a favor, in
a sense, but you sort of will, you'll clarify it.
And—but your other issues, of course, go to
experts, which are very much in the sound discretion of the

6

1

Court.

I mean, I—you're welcome to argue, I'm not here to

2

cut you off, you've briefed it, I've read it.

3

they were carefully considered at the time, and those, I think

4

in all candor, highly unlikely to be reversed because of the

5

discretion element.

6

point.

7
8

your Honor. I won't—
THE COURT: That sort of cuts out Ms. Van Orman's
argument a little bit.

11
12

MS. VAN ORMAN: Although I just would like to
clarify some things—

13
14

If you're right, you're right on this

MR. RATY: Okay. All right. Well, I appreciate it,

9
10

It's just that

THE COURT: You can put them on the record, if you
wish.

15

MS. VAN ORMAN:

—just for Mr. Raty's sake.

16

THE COURT: And you may respond if you want the

17

benefit of the record, because you may be taking it up and you

18

may want something—

19

MR. RATY: Right.

20

THE COURT: That's fine.

21

MR. RATY: Okay.

22

MS. VAN ORMAN:

If—if you look at the statute, I

23

think there's a reason that it's not the customary practice

24

for everybody to arbitrate these matters before filing suit or

25 I whatnot.

I understand his provision is in 2(e); however, if

you look at 2, Provision 2 in its entirety, what they're
talking about is the reasonable value of the medical expenses,
not what was necessarily incurred in the accident.

It's the

value of the services.
In other words, if we contested Chiropractor A o r —
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

—Doctor B saying his charges were

excessive—
THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm thinking.

It—it-

-it~
MS. VAN ORMAN:
THE COURT:

— i n the community—

—it's a mechanism for the insurers to

deal with it rather than—yeah.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

Right.

But we're also not talking

about—the jury was asked, Was—did Mr. Vaughn sustain $3,000
as a result of this accident.
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MS. VAN ORMAN: We stipulated, in fact, that the
charges of the providers were reasonable. And I think Section
2 talks about the reasonable value of the provider, so if we
hadn't stipulated to that and if that was an issue where, you
know, some chiropractor comes in and charges $700 a visit,
obviously, we're going to say that's not the practice in the
community.
THE COURT: Uh huh.

8

MS. VAN ORMAN: And you look at that and they're
talking about relative value studies, what to look at there,
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

I know.

Section (b) talks about seventy-

fifth percentile. Then there's the schedules, then the
commissioner of insurance, then you get to (e) and that's when
you talk about, all right, if you get to the bottom of it and
there's still a dispute, take it before a medical panel and
they'll tell you what's the reasonable amount in this
community.
This is not on what is related to the accident.
This is what is the charges, what are reasonable.
THE COURT: Your fundamental proximate cause
argument, which is what the argument of the trial was all
about.
MS. VAN ORMAN: Exactly.
THE COURT: What most of them are about.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

Exactly. And so I just wanted to

point that out for the record, that I think the—the entire
arbitration panel is a last resort on if there's a dispute as
to the amount of the—the value of the medical services, how
much the providers charge. And I think we stipulated to that.
THE COURT: On the other hand, I'm not aware of
anything that specifically states that—that whether they met
threshold should be a separate jury question.

9

I just know we

do it all the time, that makes sense to me, but that may be an
issue that needs to be addressed, you know.
MS. VAN ORMAN: Well, there—
THE COURT: And I—I leave it in your hands, both of
you.
MS. VAN ORMAN: And there is a standard in Utah that
says it has to be reasonable and necessary.
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MS. VAN ORMAN: The $3,000 has to be reasonable and
necessary.

Well, reasonable is the amount; but then

necessary.

And I've taken this before the Supreme Court now

twice in PIP cases, that the charges have to be necessarily
related to the accident and that's an issue for the jury.
We've had—I've had a few PIP cases that, oh,
they've arisen into huge bad faith allegations where
essentially what it boiled down to is, were those $3,000
incurred, were they a result of the accident?

Not just

because they were incurred, it's not a strict liability.

It's

essentially, were they related and the judges have all said
it's—it's an issue for the jury, it's an issue of fact.
THE COURT: Uh huh.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

So, that's where we are.

THE COURT: Arid I'm still there.
Mr. Raty, do you wish the benefit of the record any
further?

10

MR. RATY:
THE COURT:

I think it's all in my brief, your Honor.
It is. It's well-briefed.

Ms. Van Orman# will you prepare an order denying the

MS. VAN ORMAN:

I will, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I may or may not read about it.
Thank you.
MR. RATY: Thank you, your Honor.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

Thank you.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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